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The article 
 
Licensing deals between videogame GHYHORSHUVDQGFHOHEULWLHVIRUWKHXVHRIWKHODWWHU¶V
OLNHQHVVHVLQWKHIRUPHU¶VSURGXFWVDUHEHFRPLQJLQFUHDVLQJO\FRPPRQSODFH7KHVHDUH
DFWLYLWLHVWKDWZRXOGEHJRYHUQHGE\WKHODZUHODWLQJWRWKHµULJKWRISXEOLFLW\¶LQWKH86DQG
by the law relating WRWKHµULJKWRISHUVRQDOLW\¶LQYDULRXVFRQWLQHQWDO(XURSHDQMXULVGLFWLRQV
However, no equivalent legal framework exists in the UK. 
 This article considers the extent to which the relevant intellectual property 
frameworks in the UK prohibit or permit the unauthorised use of celebrity likenesses in 
videogames, in particular copyright law, the law of passing off, and trade mark law.  
 The article concludes that, given recent developments within the law of passing off 
and the law of trade mark, it may no longer be untenable to suggest that such uses could be 
caught by these two legal regimes. In doing so, it also highlights how far the ambit of these 
two regimes has expanded in recent decades.   
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Introduction 
 
Videogames have come a long way since the early days of Spacewar! and Pong. Nowhere 
has the march of technology been more evident than in their visual displays. Contemporary 
big-budget videogames are capable of rendering environments, objects and characters at 
tremendously high levels of detail and realism ± a stark contrast to the flat backgrounds and 
simple shapes of their early predecessors. Among other things, these technological advances 
have enabled videogame developers to depict likenesses of individuals with an increasing 
degree of fidelity. It is now not uncommon to see videogame characters bearing the 
likenesses of well-known celebrities: tKHODWHVWHQWU\LQ(OHFWURQLF$UWV¶FIFA football game 
series depicts players from the Premier League, the Bundesliga, Serie A and some 30 other 
leagues in almost photo-realistic detail; music rhythm games such as Guitar Hero and Rock 
Band feature highly recognisable ± though somewhat stylised ± depictions of well-known 
musicians.  
Because of this, licensing deals between videogame developers and celebrities for the 
XVHRIWKHODWWHU¶VQDPHDQGOLNHQHVVDUHQRZFRPPRQSODFH7KLVKDVEHFRPHDQLQFUHDVLQJO\
lucrative revenue stream for celebrities: in 2015, reality television personality Kim 
Kardashian was estimated to have received a net revenue of USD 20 million ± or 45% of the 
total profits ± from the mobile game Kim Kardashian: Hollywood, which, as the name 
suggests, prominently features a character who bears her likeness.1 At the other end of the 
spectrum, videogame developers who have chosen not to secure licences for their use of the 
likenesses of well-known figures have increasingly found themselves the subject of legal 
action. Most recently, a group of retired National Football League players succeeded in their 
VXLWDJDLQVW(OHFWURQLF$UWVIRUWKHXQDXWKRULVHGXVHRIWKHLUOLNHQHVVHVLQWKHODWWHU¶VMadden 
                                                          
1
 15REHKPHG µ1R.LP.DUGDVKLDQ3UREDEO\'LGQ¶W0DNH0LOOLRQ)URP+HUL3KRQH*DPH¶Forbes, 8 
March 2016) < https://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2016/03/08/no-kim-kardashian-probably-didnt-
make-80-million-from-her-iphone-game/> accessed 8 August 2017. 
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NFL series,2 while personalities as diverse as actress Lindsay Lohan and former military 
dictator Manuel Noriega have instituted legal proceedings against the developers of, 
respectively, Grand Theft Auto 5 and Call of Duty: Black Ops II on the same basis.3 All of 
these were proceedings brought in the US, where the laws of some 28 states recognise, to 
varying degrees, the LQGLYLGXDO¶VVR-FDOOHGµULJKWRISXEOLFLW\¶QDPHO\WKHULJKWto control the 
commercial exploitation of their name, image, voice, and other aspects of their identity.4  
Unlike these US states, the UK currently has no specific law granting individuals 
exclusive rights in the commercial use of their likeness.5 While a number of continental 
(XURSHDQ MXULVGLFWLRQV GR UHFRJQLVH D µULJKW RI SHUVRQDOLW\¶ ZKLFK LV IRXQGHG RQ WKH
SURWHFWLRQRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSULYDF\GLJQLW\DQGLQWHJULW\6 the law relating to privacy in the 
UK has not developed so as to confer similar levels of protection against the unauthorised use 
RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V QDPH DQG image.7 Thus, while the UK courts are no strangers to the 
SKHQRPHQRQ RI µSHUVRQDOLW\ PHUFKDQGLVLQJ¶ ± WKDW LV WKH XVH RI D FHOHEULW\¶V QDPH DQGRU
image to promote the sale of products and services ± they have had to grapple with these 
cases through a variety of intellectual property frameworks, each of which is concerned with 
a different aspect of such exploitation.  
The aim of this article, therefore, is to consider the extent to which the relevant 
intellectual property frameworks ± copyright law, the law of passing off, and the law of trade 
marks ± prohibit or permit the unauthorised recreation of a personal likeness in a videogame. 
It will demonstrate that, while the outcome of any specific case will of course depend on a 
                                                          
2
 Davis v Electronic Arts Inc 775 3 F 3d 1172 (9th Circuit, 6 January 2015). See also In Re NCAA Student-
Athlete Name and Likeness Licensing Litigation 724 F 3d 1268 (9th Circuit, 31 July 2013). 
3
 Gravano v Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc 37 NYS 3d 20 (New York Supreme Court, 1 September 2016); 
Manuel Noriega v Activision Blizzard Inc No BC 551747 (California Superior Court, 15 July 2014).  
4
 For an overview, see D Gervais and M/+ROPHVµ)DPH3URSHUW\DQG,GHQWLW\7KH6FRSHDQG3XUSRVHRIWKe 
5LJKWRI3XEOLFLW\¶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Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 181. 
5
 See Elvis Presley Trade Marks >@53&6LPRQ%URZQ/-VWDWLQJWKDWWKHUHLVQRµIUHHVWDQGLQJ
general right to character exploitation enjoyaEOHH[FOXVLYHO\E\WKHFHOHEULW\¶ 
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 )RUDQRYHUYLHZVHH+&DUW\µ$GYHUWLVLQJ3XEOLFLW\5LJKWVDQG(QJOLVK/DZ¶>@Intellectual Property 
Quarterly 209, 224 ± 227. 
7
 See Campbell v MGN Ltd >@8.+/>@/RUG1LFKROOVVWDWLQJWKDWµ>L@Q WKLVFRXQWU\«WKHUHLVQR
over-arching, all-HPEUDFLQJFDXVHRIDFWLRQIRU³LQYDVLRQRISULYDF\´¶ 
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number of different factors ± including the identity of the individual whose likeness has been 
recreated, the context in which that likeness is used, and the way in which the videogame is 
marketed and advertised ± in a typical case where the likeness of a celebrity in a field such as 
entertainment or sport has been recreated by a videogame developer without their permission, 
it is now no longer impossible for the celebrity to make out a claim in passing off, and to a 
lesser extent in trade mark infringement, against the developer. While cases of this kind 
would remain on the margins of these intellectual property regimes, the fact that these 
regimes cannot be dismissed out of hand as being inapplicable to an activity so far removed 
from the paradigmatic case of infringement is an indication of how far the courts have 
broadened the traditional remit of each of these regimes. Questions can therefore be raised as 
to the extent to which such expansion has destabilised the nature and scope of the protection 
conferred by these regimes, and the potential unintended consequences of such destabilisation. 
 
 
Copyright law 
 
Copyright infringement occurs where an unauthorised person carries out an act falling within 
WKHFRS\ULJKWRZQHU¶VH[FOXVLYHSXUYLHZLQUHODWLRQHLWKHUWRWKHZKROHRIDSURWHFWHGZRUNRU
a substantial part of it.8  Where a videogame developer has recreated the likeness of an 
individual in a videogame, the question of whether this amounts to an infringement of 
copyright is thus the familiar one of whether, in the process of doing so, the developer has 
reproduced a substantial part of a protected work. In the vast majority of such cases, the 
answer to this question will almost certainly be in the negative. This is because there is no 
obvious work upon which such a claim might be founded. The facial appearance of an 
                                                          
8
 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 16. 
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individual is not, in itself, a work capable of being protected by copyright; it would therefore 
not be an infringement for a videogame developer to recreate it in digital form.9  
It is true that, in cases involving the unauthorised depiction of fictional characters, the 
courts have come to take an extraordinarily relaxed approach towards the need for the 
claimant to identify a specific work or works whose copyright is said to be infringed. In the 
early case of King Features Syndicate, Inc v O and M Kleeman, Ltd, the defendants were held 
to have infringed the claimants¶ FRS\ULJKW WKURXJK WKHXQDXWKRULVHGSURGXFWLRQDQG VDOHRI
merchandise bearing the likeness of the popular character Popeye the Sailor, who was the 
protagonist of the FODLPDQWV¶ comic strips.10 In keeping with orthodox copyright reasoning, 
the court was careful to emphasise that its decision was not based on the finding that the 
defendants had copied or misappropriated the Popeye character as such, but rather upon the 
finding that the defendants had, in doing so, reproduced a substantial part of a drawing in 
which the character was depicted. Fifty years later, however, in a case involving the 
unauthorised production of Teletubbies t-shirts, Laddie J was prepared to find that the 
JDUPHQWVLQTXHVWLRQZHUHµDVXEVWDQWLDOUHSURGXFWLRQRIRQHRURWKHUSLHFHVRIDUWZRUNZKLFK
the plaintiffs have generated in designing the Teletubby SURJUDPPHV¶ HYHQ WKRXJK WKH
claimants themselves had conceded that there was no way of identifying a specific artistic 
work, out of the many then in existence, RIZKLFKWKHGHIHQGDQWV¶W-shirts could be said to be 
an unauthorised reproduction.11 Even more recently, the Court of Appeal in R v Gilham 
appeared satisfied simply to assume that the images of videogame characters that were shown 
RQWKHVFUHHQRUPRQLWRUGXULQJSOD\ZHUHQHFHVVDULO\µFRSLHVDQGVXEVWDQWLDOFRSLHV¶RIWKH
drawings in which those characters had originally been depicted.12  This was despite the 
complete absence of any evidence that those characters had begun life as conventional 
                                                          
9
 M Vitoria et al, Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria: The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (4th edn, LexisNexis, 
2011), [40.19]. 
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 [1941] AC 417. 
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 BBC Worldwide Ltd v Pally Screen Printing Ltd  [1998] FSR 665. 
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drawings created through traditional means ± and, indeed, the complete absence of evidence 
as to the existence of any such drawings at all.13 It is unlikely, however, for the same line of 
reasoning to be extended to the unauthorised depiction of real individuals, as the facial 
appearance of a person cannot, even by the greatest stretch of the imagination, be said to 
originate from a copyright work. 
The likeness of an individual can of course be captured in a photograph, which is 
capable of being protected by copyright as an artistic work. However, even if a videogame 
developer were to make unauthorised use of such a photograph as a basis for the recreation of 
LWVVXEMHFW¶VOLNHQHVV ± and even if the owner of the copyright of the photograph were able to 
prove that it was that specific photograph, rather than any other, that had been used ± it is still 
unlikely for a substantial part of the photograph to be reproduced in the process. In order to 
determine whether a substantial part of a work has been reproduced, the courts will look to 
whether the part taken contains elements through which the originality of the work is 
expressed.14 The originality of a portrait photograph, in turn, has been held to subsist in 
elements such as the choice of background, the pose of the subject, the lighting, framing and 
angle of view, and so forth.15 These elements are unlikely to be reproduced where the subject 
of such a photograph is recreated as a character in a videogame, as the character will typically 
be shown in a range of environments and poses, which will almost certainly differ from those 
in the photograph. In these circumstances, the most that the developer can be said to have 
taken from the photograph is the raw data relating to the facial appearance of the subject, 
such as the distance between the eyes, the width of the nose, the length of the jawline, and so 
on. As the originality of the photograph does not subsist in these features, the recreation of 
                                                          
13
 )RUD VLPLODUFULWLTXH VHH'%RRWRQDQG$0DF&XOORFK µLiability for the Circumvention of Technological 
Protection Measures AppOLHG WR 9LGHRJDPHV /HVVRQV IURP WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP¶V ([SHULHQFH¶ >@ 
Journal of Business Law 165, 185. 
14
 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening EU:C:2009:465, [39]; SAS Institute Inc v World 
Programming Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1482, [38]. 
15
 Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH EU:C:2011:798, [91]. 
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WKH VXEMHFW¶V OLNHQHVV LQ WKH IRUP RI D YLGHRJDPH FKDUDFWHU ZRXOG QRW DPRXQW WR DQ
infringement of the copyright in the photograph.16 
 
 
Passing off 
 
In its classic form, the action in passing off enables the claimant to prevent the defendant 
IURPSDVVLQJWKHODWWHU¶VJRRGVRUVHUYLFHVRIIDVLIWKH\ZHUHWKHIRUPHU¶VRZQ,QRUGHUWR
make out a claim in passing off, the claimant must establish, first, that they have goodwill in 
relation to the goods or services in question, which is typically associated with the name or 
sign by which the source of the goods is indicated; second, that the defendant has made a 
PLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQWKDWLVOLNHO\WRPLVOHDGWKHSXEOLFLQWREHOLHYLQJWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VJRRGV
or services originate from the claimant; and third, that the claimant has suffered or is likely to 
VXIIHUGDPDJHDVDFRQVHTXHQFHRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VPLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ17  
The courts have traditionally been reluctant to find passing off in cases involving 
unauthorised personality merchandising. Claimants in these cases found it difficult to 
establish that they had the requisite goodwill in the use of their likenesses. In particular, they 
had trouble persuading the courts that consumers were likely to regard the presence of a 
FHOHEULW\¶VOLNHQHVVRQa product as an indication of its source, rather than as an element of 
the product itself.18 $V/DGGLH-SXWLWµ:KHQDIDQEX\VDSRVWHURUDFXSEHDULQJDQLPDJH
of his star, he is buying a likeness, not a product from a parWLFXODU VRXUFH¶ 19  As a 
consequence, claimants in these cases also had difficulty making out an actionable 
misrepresentation on the part of the defendant. This was especially the case where the 
claimants themselves were not engaged in the production and distribution of products of a 
                                                          
16
 Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH EU:C:2011:798, [AG129]. 
17
 Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc (No 3) [1990] 1 WLR 491. 
18
 Lyngstad v Anabas Products Ltd [1977] FSR 62; Halliwell v Panini (Unreported, 6 June 1997); Elvis Presley 
Trade Marks [1999] RPC 567. 
19
 Elvis Presley Trade Marks [1997] RPC 543, 554. 
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similar nature. ,W ZDV RQ WKLV EDVLV WKDW 2OLYHU - GLVPLVVHG WKH 6ZHGLVK SRS JURXS $EED¶V
claim of passing off in Lyngstad v Anabas Products Ltd, a case involving the unauthorised 
sale of merchandise bearing the EDQGPHPEHUV¶OLNenesses.20 He held that, as the band itself 
had not at any time marketed similar merchandise in the UK, it could not be said that the 
defendants were misleading the public into confusing their products with products 
manufactured by the band. He also took note of the fact that, at the time, there was no 
evidence of any general custom for merchandising licences to be granted by pop singers ± 
indeed, such evidence as was available pointed to the contrary. In the circumstances, he 
concluded that nR RQH µFRXOG UHDVRQDEO\ LPDJLQH WKDW DOO WKH SRS VWDUV QDPHG LQ >WKH
GHIHQGDQW¶V@ DGYHUWLVHPHQWV ZHUH JLYLQJ WKHLU DSSURYDO WR WKH JRRGV RIIHUHG RU WKDW WKH
defendants were doing anything more than catering for a popular demand among teenagers 
for effigies RI WKHLU LGROV¶ 21  Under this view of the law, it seems unlikely that the 
XQDXWKRULVHGUHFUHDWLRQRIDFHOHEULW\¶VOikeness in a videogame would be treated as an act of 
passing off.  
2YHU WLPHKRZHYHU WKHHOHPHQWV LQ WKHµFODVVLF WULQLW\¶RI WKHDFWLRQ Ln passing off 
have been broadened in ways that have made the tort more and more capable of 
accommodating cases of personality merchandising, and the courts have shown an increased 
willingness to bring cases of this kind within its remit. This has taken place against the 
backdrop of an environment where merchandising and endorsement have become an 
important revenue streams for celebrities, and the purchasing public has become increasingly 
aware of this fact. The first shift in the direction of this more expansive approach occurred 
QRW LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI SHUVRQDOLW\ PHUFKDQGLVLQJ LWVHOI EXW LQ WKH UHODWHG ILHOG RI µFKDUDFWHU
PHUFKDQGLVLQJ¶ ZKHUH WKH QDPHV DQG OLNHQHVVHV RI ILFWLRQDO FKDUDFWHUV ± rather than real 
celebrities ± are used to promote the sale of products. In Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat 
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 [1977] FSR 62. 
21
 [1977] FSR 62, 68. 
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Clothing Co Ltd, the defendants were held to be liable in passing off for having licensed the 
manufacture and sale of garments bearing the image of four humanoid cartoon turtles which 
were said to resemble the FODLPDQW¶VFDUWRRQFKDUDFWHUVWKH7HHQDJH0XWDQW1LQMD7XUWOHV22 
In doing so, the court broadened the scope of the elements of passing off in the following 
ways.  
First, and for the first time, the court was prepared to acknowledge that consumers 
might, at least in certain circumstances, view the presence of a fictional character on a 
product as being an indication of its source. As Browne-Wilkinson VC noted, the evidence in 
WKHFDVHVKRZHGWKDWµa substantial number of the buying public now expect and know that 
where a famous cartoon or television character is reproduced on goods, that reproduction is 
the result of a licence granted by the owner of the copyright or owner of other rights in that 
character¶23 Second, the court took the position that, in order to establish that it had the 
requisite goodwill, the claimant need not show that it was directly engaged in the 
manufacture and sale of similar products; it was sufficient if the claimant was able to 
demonstrate that it was in the business of licensing the reproduction of the character in 
question on products made and sold by third parties. Third, the court accepted that an 
actionable misrepresentation could occur not only where the defendant had misled the public 
into believing that its goods were manufactured or sold by the claimant, but also where the 
defendant had misrepresented its goods as having been licensed or approved by the claimant 
LQ VRPH ZD\ ZKLFK LW KDG GRQH RQ WKH IDFWV )RXUWK WKH FRXUW UHFRJQLVHG WKH FODLPDQW¶V
potential loss of licensing revenue in these circumstances as an actionable head of damage.  
At the time Mirage Studios was decided, most commentators were of the view that it 
would be treated as being limited to its particular facts, or at most, confined to cases of 
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character merchandising, rather than being extended to cases of personality merchandising.24 
This was especially the case given that Browne-Wilkinson VC had taken pains to distinguish 
Mirage Studios from the personality merchandising cases in which no passing off had been 
found, on the basis that the claimant in Mirage Studios both had copyright in its drawings of 
the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles and was in the business of licensing the reproduction of 
these drawings on a large scale, unlike the claimants in the personality merchandising cases. 
In a number of personality merchandising cases decided post-Mirage Studios, the courts did 
continue to find largely in favour of the defendant. Although a rare finding of passing off was 
made in the case of Irvine v Talksport Ltd, Laddie J was careful to distinguish the facts of that 
case, which he characterised as one of false endorsement, from those of a typical personality 
merchandising case.25  
In the most recent case to deal with personality merchandising, however, the courts 
have shown themselves prepared to make use of the flexibility developed through the 
character merchandising cases in the context of personality merchandising ± and, in some 
respects, to take them even further. This was the high-profile case of Fenty v Arcadia Group 
Brands Ltd (No 2), which arose from an action brought by the famous pop star Rihanna 
DJDLQVW WKHIDVKLRQUHWDLOHU7RSVKRSIRU WKH ODWWHU¶VXQDXWKRULVHGVDOHRI W-shirts bearing the 
IRUPHU¶VOLNHQHVV26 At first instance, Topshop was found to be liable in passing off, and this 
decision was affirmed on appeal. Both Birss J and first instance and Kitchin J at the Court of 
Appeal were careful to emphasise that the law of the UK did not recognise a general right for 
a person, whether famous or otherwise, to control the use of their image. It was therefore 
necessary for Rihanna to make out the three elements of goodwill, misrepresentation, and 
GDPDJHZKLFKRQ WKHHYLGHQFHVKHZDVIRXQG WRKDYHGRQH5LKDQQD¶VPHUFKDQGLVLQJDQG
endorsement operation, which included numerous arrangements entered into with fashion 
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 See generally L Bently and B Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (4th edn, OUP, 2014), 857. 
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designers and retailers, was held to give rise to the requisite goodwill. Both the first instance 
and appellate judges also acknowledged that consumers would not automatically assume that 
all merchandise bearing the likeness of a celebrity had necessarily been authorised by the 
celebrity in question; accordingly, they took pains to emphasise that the mere presence of a 
FHOHEULW\¶VOLNHQHVVRQDSURGXFWFRXOGQRWEHUHJDUGHGLQDOOFDVHVDUHSUHVHQtation that the 
product had been authorised by that celebrity. They did, however, agree that an actionable 
PLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ KDG EHHQ PDGH E\ 7RSVKRS LQ WKLV SDUWLFXODU FDVH JLYHQ 7RSVKRS¶V
previous attempts at establishing a connection in the public mind between itself and Rihanna, 
as well as the nature of the image featured on the t-shirt, which showed Rihanna with the 
hairstyle featured in the marketing campaign for one of her albums.  
The significance of the decision in Fenty is fourfold. First of all, and in a departure 
from the previous cases involving personality merchandising, the decision makes it very clear 
WKDWWKHXQDXWKRULVHGXVHRIDFHOHEULW\¶VOLNHQHVVRQDSURGXFWFDQLQWKHULJKWFLUFXPVWDQFHV
amount to passing off. Second, it also provides a clear indication that the courts no longer 
perceive a sharp distinction between cases of character merchandising and cases of 
personality merchandising. As Birss J himself would go on to acknowledge in a subsequent 
case, the difference between the two is a matter of degree rather than kind: 
 
«7KHUHLVQRODZZKLFKSURYLGHVWKDWLQYHQWHGFKDUDFWHUVKDYHVWURQJHUULJKWVWKDQUHDOSHRSOHLQWKLV
regard but it does seem to me that it is probably easier to educate the public to believe that goods 
relating to an invented character derive from a single official source than it might be for a real person, 
not least because copyright law may give the inventor the ability to control the reproduction of the 
character for a very long time.27 
 
Third, the decision has in some respects expanded the concept of goodwill even 
further than the character merchandising cases have done. In Mirage Studios, the court made 
a positive finding in relation to goodwill on the basis that the claimant was in the specific 
business of licensing the reproduction of the copyright works in which those particular 
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fictional characters were depicted. By the time Fenty came to be decided, the court appeared 
to taNHWKLVUHDVRQLQJHYHQIXUWKHU WKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKHFODLPDQW¶V ODUJHPHUFKDQGLVLQJand 
HQGRUVHPHQWRSHUDWLRQLQWKHILHOGRIIDVKLRQJHQHUDOO\WRJHWKHUZLWKWKHFODLPDQW¶VVWDWXVDV
a style icon, was sufficient for a finding of goodwill.  
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the decision is likely to have something of a 
self-perpetuating effect. It is true that the judges were at pains to emphasise that their decision 
was based on the particular facts of the case, and should not be understood as laying down a 
general rule prohibiting all third-party sales of merchandise bearing a celebrLW\¶V OLNHQHVV
without a licence. Notwithstanding this, however, one very probable consequence of the 
decision is that a significant proportion of traders currently engaged in the production and 
sale of such merchandise will feel greater pressure either to regularise their activities by 
obtaining an appropriate licence, or to decrease them altogether. This would lead to a 
VLJQLILFDQWGHFUHDVHLQWKHDPRXQWRIµXQOLFHQVHG¶PHUFKDQGLVHLQWKHPDUNHWSODFH; over time, 
consumers would come to assume that a produFWEHDULQJDFHOHEULW\¶VOLNHQHVVZRXOGPRUH
often than not, be made and sold under a licence from the celebrity in question. Should this 
come to pass, it might only be a matter of time before the courts came to accept that, as a 
general rule, the placing RI D FHOHEULW\¶V OLNHQHVV RQ D SURGXFW ZRXOG FRQVWLWXWH D
representation that the product in question had been authorised by that celebrity, unless 
circumstances indicate otherwise.  
As the law currently stands, therefore, it would be unwise for a videogame developer 
WRGLVPLVVWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWWKHUHFUHDWLRQRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VOLNHQHVVLQDYLGHRJDPHPLJKW
amount to an actionable misrepresentation in passing off. Much will depend on the 
characteristics of the individual whose likeness has been used, as well as the context in which 
their likeness is used. Where the individual in question is a public figure who does not and 
would not be expected to engage in any sort of merchandise licensing, such as a political 
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leader, then it seems unlikely that the elements of goodwill and misrepresentation will be 
made out. In contrast, where the likeness that has been recreated belongs to a well-known 
figure in a field such as music, entertainment or sport, and who is engaged in the business of 
merchandising and endorsement, a claim in passing off can be made out much more easily. 
As explained previously, licensing deals between videogame developers and celebrities have 
become increasingly commonplace, and consumers are likely to be aware of this. Speaking in 
the context of the Kim Kardashian videogame, videogame designer and critic Ian Bogost has 
noted WKDW µOLNH SHUIXPH RU FORWKLQJ UDQJHV PRELOH JDPHV DUH QRZ DQ RUGLQDU\ H[SHFWHG
SURGXFW IRU IDQV RI WKHVH VWDUV WR RZQ¶28 Where a character bearing the likeness of such a 
celebrity is featured in a videogame, therefore, it is well within the realm of possibility that a 
significant proportion of consumers will be left with the impression that the inclusion of that 
character must have been authorised by the celebrity in question. A possible exception would 
be where the celebrity is portrayed in an unflattering light by the videogame, as consumers 
might be less inclined to believe that such a portrayal had been authorised by the celebrity; 
however, this would not necessarily be conclusive.29  
One obstacle that might be faced by a claimant in such a case is that of establishing 
the existence of goodwill. Although a very broad view of goodwill was taken in Fenty, Birss 
-GLGSODFHDW OHDVWVRPHZHLJKWRQ5LKDQQD¶VPHUFKDQGLVLQJDQGHQGRUVHPHQWDFWLYLWLHV LQ
the field of fashion. In contrast, a celebrity whose likeness has been recreated in a videogame 
without their authorisation might not have previously engaged in any merchandising 
activities related to videogames. However, given that so many celebrities whose core 
activities are similarly unrelated to the field of videogames have nevertheless concluded 
licensing agreements with videogame developers, a future court, if called upon to decide such 
                                                          
28
 .:LOOVµ7D\ORU 6ZLIWLVWKH/DWHVW&HOHEULW\WR0DUNHW+HUVHOIYLDD0RELOH*DPH¶Independent, 4 February 
2016) <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/taylor-swift-is-the-latest-celebrity-to-market-
herself-via-glu-mobile-a6854251.html> accessed 8 August 2017. 
29
 [2013] EWHC 2310 (Ch)>@%LUVV-VXJJHVWLQJWKDWµWKHOHVVIODWWHULQJWKHLPDJHWKHOHVVOLNHO\LWLVWKDWLW
ZRXOGEHWKRXJKWWREHDXWKRULVHG¶ 
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a case, might well conclude that the element of goodwill would be made out if the claimant 
could show evidence of merchandising and endorsement activity generally, or at least a 
pattern of merchandising and endorsement activity that might lead consumers to believe that 
WKH\KDGDXWKRULVHGWKHLQFOXVLRQRIWKHLUOLNHQHVVLQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VYLGHRJDPHThis would, 
in many respects, represent a continuation of the expansionary trend begun in Mirage Studios 
and carried on in Fenty.  
A second question that arises in cases of this kind is the point in time at which the 
actionable misrepresentation must occur, an issue that has remained largely unexplored. In a 
typical case of personality merchandising, the relevant misrepresentation occurs at the point 
of sale, as the likeness or name of the celebrity is featured on the products themselves. This 
will also be the case where the likeness of the celebrity is featured on the box art for the 
videogame, or the screenshots used to promote the videogame in an online marketplace. An 
issue arises, however, where the likeness of a celebrity is used in a videogame, but is not 
IHDWXUHGLQLWVPDUNHWLQJPDWHULDOV7KLVPHDQVWKDWFRQVXPHUVZLOOHQFRXQWHUWKHFHOHEULW\¶V
likeness only after they have purchased the videogame and have begun to play it; any 
misrepresentation will therefore occur only after the point of sale. In the few cases in which 
this issue has arisen, the courts have typically held that the actionable misrepresentation must 
occur at the point of sale.30 However, this is not a blanket rule, and the courts have on a few 
occasions treated the relevant time as the time at which the products in question were used. 
This was the case in Marengo v Daily Sketch and Sunday Graphic Ltd 31  and Clark v 
Associated Newspapers Ltd, 32  two passing off actions brought in relation to the 
misrepresentation of the authorship of, respectively, several cartoons and a series of satirical 
articles, which had in each case been published in a newspaper belonging to the defendant. In 
each case, the actionable misrepresentation was held to have occurred at the point at which 
                                                          
30
 Bostik Ltd v Sellotape GB Ltd [1994] RPC 556. 
31
 [1992] FSR 1; (1948) 65 RPC 242. 
32
 [1998] 1 WLR 1558. 
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the cartoons were viewed and the articles were read, rather than at the point at which the 
newspapers were purchased. There is therefore precedent, should the courts choose to apply it, 
for holding that the actionable misrepresentation may occur at the point at which the 
videogame is played, rather than looking solely to the time at which it is purchased. This is 
particularly the case given that videogames, like cartoons and newspaper articles, are 
protected to at least some extent as copyright works under the law of the UK.33  
Equally, there are also grounds on which the cases such as Marengo and Clark might 
be distinguished from the general run of passing off cases. In particular, they can justifiably 
be regarded as sui generis examples of cases where the rules of passing off have been utilised 
to protect the rights of artists and writers to be identified as the authors of their works.34 This 
would have been particularly significant for cases decided prior to the coming into force of 
the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, when the moral right of attribution had yet to 
find its way into the legislation on copyright. As the recreation of celebrity likenesses in 
videogames does not raise any particular issues concerning authorship, it can be argued that 
the principles applied in Marengo and Clark are not generalizable to such cases. Furthermore, 
the argXPHQWV WKDW KDYH EHHQ DGYDQFHG LQ VXSSRUW RI ZKDW KDV EHHQ WHUPHG µSRVW-sale 
FRQIXVLRQ¶DUHQRWSDUWLFXODUO\UREXVWQRUGRWKH\DSSHDUSDUWLFXODUO\UHOHYDQWLQWKHFRQWH[W
of videogames.35  It remains to be seen whether the courts will, in such cases, take the 
opportunity to expand this dimension of the element of misrepresentation still further. While 
arguments can be made against such expansion, the possibility cannot be discounted lightly, 
particularly if the decision in Fenty is seen as marking the start of a more expansive judicial 
approach towards claims of passing off in the personality merchandising context. 
 
                                                          
33
 Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd [2006] EWHC 24 (Ch); [2007] EWCA Civ 219. See also 
Nintendo Co Ltd v PC Box Srl EU:C:2014:25, [21] ± [23]. 
34
 See C Wadlow, The Law of Passing Off: Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2011), [8-105]. 
35
 See the discussion below. 
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Trade mark law 
 
An infringement of a registered trade mark occurs where an unauthorised third party, acting 
in the course of trade, either uses a sign that is identical to the registered mark in relation to 
goods or services that are identical to those for which the mark has been registered; or uses a 
sign that is similar to the registered mark in relation to similar or identical goods or services, 
OHDGLQJWRDOLNHOLKRRGRIFRQIXVLRQ)RUWKHXQDXWKRULVHGUHFUHDWLRQRIDFHOHEULW\¶VOLNHQHVV
in a videogame to amount to infringement, therefore, it must first be shown that the recreation 
is identical or similar to a registered trade mark.  
The successful registration of a trade mark capable of protecting against the 
unauthorised use of their likenesses remains something of a vexed issue for celebrities ± or, in 
the case of celebrities who are deceased, their heirs and representatives. For a trade mark to 
be validly registered, it must be a sign that is capable of being represented graphically and 
capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of another.36 
7KHIDFLDODSSHDUDQFHRIDQ LQGLYLGXDO LVQRW LQ LWVHOID µVLJQ¶FDSDEOHRIUHJLVWUDWLRQ7KH
closest that an individual would be able to come to obtaining a trade mark in their likeness 
would be to register a photograph of themselves as a trade mark. In the past, would-be 
registrants have found it difficult to establish that the image of a celebrity is capable of 
fulfilling the final requirement for registration, namely that of distinctiveness, for much the 
same reasons as the claimants in the earlier personality merchandising cases found it difficult 
to demonstrate that they possessed the requisite goodwill for a claim in passing off.  
This, it appears, remains the official position of the UK Intellectual Property Office. 
Its Trade Marks Manual explains that a picture of a famous person presents similar issues as 
famous names in relation to registrability but, depending on the goods for which registration 
LVVRXJKWPD\EHHYHQPRUH OLNHO\µWREH WDNHQDVPHUHGHFRUDWLRQDQG WKHUHIRUH WR ODFND
                                                          
36
 Trade Marks Act 1994, s 1(1). 
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trade marNFKDUDFWHU¶FRPSDUHGWRIDPRXVQDPHV37 In relation to famous names, meanwhile, 
WKHPDQXDOVWDWHVWKDWVXFKQDPHVµPD\DSSHDUWRWKHDYHUDJHFRQVXPHUDVDQLQGLFDWLRQthat 
the goods/services are about the person whose name it is rather than as an indication that the 
goods/services are supplied by, or under the control of, one XQGHUWDNLQJ¶38 At the same time, 
however, a number of well-known personalities have in more recent years succeeded in 
obtaining trade mark registrations for photographs of themselves. An example is former 
Formula One driver Damon Hill, who currently holds a trade mark in a photograph of his 
eyes looking out from the visor of his racing helmet.39  This suggests that the hurdle of 
distinctiveness, while high in such cases, is not insurmountable.  
In this regard, the decision in Fenty may well have the effect of making the task of 
establishing the distinctiveness of a celebrity image a less formidable one. While that case 
was decided in the context of passing off rather than trade mark infringement, it may 
nevertheless be indicative of an increased willingness on the part of the courts to recognise 
that the image of celebrity is capable of functioning as an indicator of origin, at least under 
certain circumstances. It has also been suggested that the decision may have something of a 
self-perpetuating effect and may, in the long run, significantly increase the likelihood of a 
celebrity image being perceived as an indicator of origin. Where trade mark examiners ± and 
the courts ± are called upon to assess the distinctiveness of a particular celebrity image on a 
trade mark application, therefore, there seems no reason why factors such as those at play in 
Fenty should not also be taken into account. Like the claimants in the passing off cases 
involving character merchandising and personality merchandising, applicants seeking the 
registration of such trade marks should be able to increase their likelihood of success if they 
are able to show that the photograph in question has been used in such a way as to cause a 
sufficient proportion of consumers to treat it as an indicator of origin, such as by using it 
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 Intellectual Property Office, Trade Marks Manual (Intellectual Property Office, 2016), 125. 
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 Intellectual Property Office, Trade Marks Manual (Intellectual Property Office, 2016), 124. 
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 Trade Mark No. UK00002036489. 
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consistently across a range of merchandise.40 In the current commercial environment, this 
might be an easier task than was previously the case, given the ubiquity of personality 
PHUFKDQGLVLQJDQGWKHSXEOLF¶VLQFUHDVHGDZDUHQHVVRIVXFKSUDFWLFHV  
Where a photograph of an individual has been successfully registered as a trade mark, 
this does not mean that the recreation of the likeness captured in the photograph will 
necessarily amount to an infringement of the mark. It is still necessary for the owner of the 
PDUN WR SURYH WKDW LQ UHFUHDWLQJ WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶s likeness in the form of a videogame 
character, the developer of the videogame has used a sign that is identical or similar to the 
registered mark in relation to similar goods or services which, by reason of the identity or 
similarity of the marks and the similarity of the goods or services to which they apply, gives 
rise to a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. A key issue that arises here is the 
extent to which the likeness of the videogame character can, in a typical case, be said to be 
µVLPLODU¶WRWKHSKRWRJUDSKIRUZKLFKWUDGHPDUNUHJLVWUDWLRQKDVEHHQREWDLQHG In the earlier 
discussion of such cases in the context of copyright law, it was explained that a videogame 
character in such a case would in all likelihood be portrayed in environments and poses 
different from those shown in the photograph; consequently, the recreation of the likeness 
depicted in the photograph would not amount to the taking of a substantial part of it. 
However, this does not necessarily also mean that no finding of similarity can be made in the 
trade mark context, as the legal tests are very different.  
Several commentators have suggested that, even if a celebrity were to successfully 
register a photograph of themselves with a trade mark, they would still only be entitled to 
prevent the unauthorised use of either the same photograph or photographs that were not 
                                                          
40
 For suggestions to this effect, see Elvis Presley Trade Marks [1997] RPC 543$6WRU\µ2ZQLQJ'LDQD
)URP 3HRSOH¶V 3ULQFHVV WR 3ULYDWH 3URSHUW\¶   Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 
<webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1998/issue5/story5.html> accessed 8 August 2017. 
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significantly different from it.41 This, in turn, implies that there must be some minimum 
degree of visual similarity between the photograph for which trade mark registration has been 
obtained and the use made by the defendant of the FHOHEULW\¶VOLNHQHVVEH\RQGWKHIDFWWKDW
they recognisably depict the same individual. $ FORVH DQDO\VLV RI WKH µJOREDO DSSUHFLDWLRQ¶
test laid down by the CJEU, however, suggests that this may not necessarily be the case.42 
Under this approach, the focus of the legal enquiry is centred upon a single question: whether 
WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V XVH RI WKH UHOHYDQW VLJQ LV RQH WKDW LV OLNHO\ WR JLYH ULVH WR D OLNHOLKRRG RI
confusion on the part of the public ± that is, whether it would cause the public to believe that 
the goods or services in question originate from the owner of the trade mark or an 
undertaking that is economically linked to the owner of the trade mark, such as a licensee or 
subsidiary. In addressing this question, the courts are called upon to undertake a global 
DVVHVVPHQWRIDOOUHOHYDQWIDFWRUV LQFOXGLQJWKHGHJUHHRIVLPLODULW\EHWZHHQWKHFODLPDQW¶V
DQGWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VPDUNVDQGWKHGHJUHHRIVLPLODULW\RIWKHJRRGVRUVHUYLFHVWRZKLFKHDFK
mark is applied.  
The Court of Appeal has made it clear that there is no minimum threshold of 
similarity that must exist between the two marks before the court will go on to consider 
ZKHWKHUDOLNHOLKRRGRIFRQIXVLRQKDVUHVXOWHGIURPWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VXVH43 It has also held that 
the question of whether the claimDQW¶V DQG GHIHQGDQW¶V PDUNV DUH VLPLODU FDQQRW EH
meaningfully isolated from questions concerning confusion. Furthermore, both the CJEU and 
the courts in the UK have held that the conceptual similarity between two marks may be 
sufficient to give rise to likelihood of confusion, even where the degree of visual similarity is 
                                                          
41
 $6WRU\µ2ZQLQJ'LDQD)URP3HRSOH¶V3ULQFHVVWR3ULYDWH3URSHUW\¶Web Journal of Current Legal 
Issues <webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1998/issue5/story5.html> accessed  $XJXVW 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&HOHEULW\,PDJH7KH,PSDFWRI'LVWLQFWLYHQHVVDQG8VHDVD7UDGH0DUN¶Bond Law Review 161, 182; 
+&DUW\µ$GYHUWLVLQJ3XEOLFLW\5LJKWVDQG(QJOLVK/DZ¶>@Intellectual Property Quarterly 209, 211. 
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 Sabel BV v Puma AG EU:C:1997: 528, [22] ± [23]; Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro Goldwyn Mayer Inc EU: 
C:1998:442, [16] ± [17]. 
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 eSure Insurance Ltd v Direct Line Insurance plc [2008] RPC 34, [48] ± [50]. cf Ferrero SpA v OHIM 
EU:C:2011:177, [66] &-(8KROGLQJWKDWZKHUHWKHUHLVQRVLPLODULW\EHWZHHQWKHPDUNVµHYHQIDLQW¶WKHUHLV
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low ± or, in some cases, non-existent.44 In Hearst Holdings Inc v AVELA Inc, the claimant 
held various trade mark registrations in the words BETTY BOOP, the name of a 1930s 
cartoon character, for certain categories of goods, including clothing and toys.45 Birss J held 
WKDWWKHFODLPDQW¶VZRUGPDUNVKDGEHHQLQIULQJHGE\WKHGHIHQGDQW¶VXVHRIDQLPDJHRIWKH
Betty Boop character on various articles of clothing. This was because the average consumer, 
XSRQVHHLQJWKHLPDJHZRXOGFDOOWRPLQGWKHZRUGVµ%HWW\%RRS¶WKHFRQFHSWXDOVLPLODULW\
EHWZHHQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VLPDJHDQGWKHFODLPDQW¶VZRUGPDUNVWKXVJDYHULVHWRDOLNHOLKRRG
of confusion among consumers as to the origin of the goods, as consumers would assume that 
goods bearing the image had been licensed by the claimant.  
Taking this to its logical conclusion, therefore, it seems at least possible to make out 
WKH DUJXPHQW WKDW HYHQ ZKHUH WKH RQO\ SRLQW RI YLVXDO VLPLODULW\ EHWZHHQ WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V
YLGHRJDPH FKDUDFWHU DQG WKH FODLPDQW¶V UHJLVWHUHG PDUN Ls the fact that they recognisably 
depict the same individual, this, taken together with the conceptual similarity between the 
two ± in that they refer to the same person ± might be sufficient to give rise to a likelihood of 
confusion on the part of consumers. This is especially the case where the factors that have 
already been discussed in relation to the element of misrepresentation are taken into account, 
LQ SDUWLFXODU FRQVXPHUV¶ DZDUHQHVV DQG H[SHFWDWLRQV RI FRQWHPSRUDU\ PHUFKDQGLVLQJ
practices. The extent to which the courts would be prepared to apply a line of reasoning 
developed in the context of character merchandising to a case that is much more akin to 
personality merchandising is, of course, not entirely clear. This is particularly the case given 
that such an approach would, in at least some circumstances, come very close to giving 
individuals a right in their own likeness, which the courts have consistently resisted. It is 
perhaps for this reason that the courts have been much more conservative about finding 
passing off in personality merchandising cases compared to cases of character merchandising. 
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Still, there seems to be nothing in the global appreciation test that would necessarily preclude 
such an outcome, given its over-arching focus on the likelihood of confusion on the part of 
the public, though a different outcome might be reached in those jurisdictions where a clearer 
conceptual distinction can be drawn between questions of similarity and questions of 
confusion.46  
As with passing off, a trade mark claim made on this basis may also raise the question 
RIWKHWLPHDWZKLFKWKHUHOHYDQWFRQIXVLRQPXVWRFFXU:KHUHWKHFHOHEULW\¶VOLNHQHVVLVQRW
IHDWXUHG RQ DQ\ RI WKH YLGHRJDPH¶V PDUNHWLQJ PDWHULDOV FRQVXPHUV ZLOO HQFRXQWHU LW RQO\
after they have purchased the videogame and begun to play it. As with misrepresentation, 
therefore, any confusion will arise only after the point of sale. Two main arguments have 
been advanced in favour of the proposition that post-sale confusion should be capable of 
satisfying the requirement of a likelihood of confusion.47 The first is that post-sale confusion 
is likely to have a negative effect on future consumer purchasing decisions. Where the 
GHIHQGDQW KDV XVHG D PDUN VLPLODU WR WKH FODLPDQW¶V RQ DQ LWHP RI LQIHrior quality, so the 
argument goes, third parties who encounter the item after it has been removed from the point 
of sale may believe it to originate from the claimant and thus form a negative opinion of the 
FODLPDQW¶VJRRGVHYHQWKRXJKWKHSXUFKDVHURIWhe item may not have been confused as to its 
origin at any point.48 The second argument, which has been invoked primarily in the context 
of high-status luxury goods, is that post-sale confusion has the effect of devaluing the trade 
mark in some general senseLIWKLUGSDUWLHVDUHXQDEOHWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQDµNQRFN-RII¶
DQGDµJHQXLQH¶DUWLFOHRQFHWKHLWHPKDVEHHQUHPRYHGIURPWKHSRLQWRIVDOH it is said, the 
prestige conferred by the mark will be eroded.  
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Neither of these arguments is particularly robust, and they are of limited relevance to 
the present scenario. Videogames, even those endorsed by a celebrity, are not generally 
regarded as high-end or high-status products. Furthermore, gaming is typically a solitary 
activity, which significantly reduces any opportunities for bystander confusion; at most, it 
might be expected to take place within a small circle of friends and family members. It can be 
argued, of course, that a purchaser who encounters the unauthorised likeness of a celebrity 
within a low-quality videogame might, in the belief that the videogame had been endorsed or 
licensed by that celebrity, form a negative opinion of the goods and services emanating from 
that celebrity, and would refuse to purchase any such goods or services in the future. Again, 
however, this argument is not particularly strong: this is in part because there appears to be 
no expectation among consumers that videogames will necessarily be of high quality simply 
because they have been endorsed by a celebrity, and in part because the negative reception 
accorded to certain celebrity-linked videogames does not appear to have affected those 
FHOHEULWLHV¶ other revenue streams in any significant way. The mobile game Katy Perry Pop, 
for example, was widely GHULGHGDVDµIORS¶.49 However, this does not appear to have had a 
significant negative impact on the eponymous pop sLQJHU¶VUHSXWDWLRQRQWKHZKROH her most 
recent album debuted at the top of the Billboard 200 record chart, and she remains very much 
a household name.  
While the arguments in favour of post-sale confusion are not particularly strong, the 
possibility that the courts may come to recognise it as an actionable form of confusion in such 
cases cannot be discounted. In recent years, both the CJEU and the courts in the UK have 
shown increasing willingness to acknowledge the relevance of post-sale confusion to cases of 
trade mark infringement. In Arsenal Football Club plc v Reed, the CJEU held that the 
GHIHQGDQW¶VXVHRIWKHFODLPDQW¶VZRUGPDUN$56(1AL on scarves and other football-related 
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paraphernalia amounted to an infringement of the mark, even though the defendant had 
placed at the point of sale a prominent notice informing customers that his goods were not 
goods officially manufactured or licensed by the claimant football club.50 This was on the 
EDVLVWKDWWKLUGSDUWLHVZKRFDPHDFURVVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VJRRGVDIWHUWKHSRLQWRIVDOHPLJKWEH
led to believe that the goods originated from the claimant. This, it was said, affected the 
essential functioQRIWKHFODLPDQW¶V WUDGHPDUNQDPHO\as a guarantee of the identity of the 
origin of goods bearing it. Subsequently, in DataCard Corpn v Eagle Technologies Ltd, 
Arnold J held that in appropriate circumstances, post-sale confusion could be relied on as 
establishing the existence of a likelihood of confusion for the purposes of a trade mark 
claim.51 The example given by Arnold J of the harm that would accrue to the trade mark 
owner as a consequence of post-sale confusion relates to the diversion of trade from the 
claimant to the defendant, and once again, appears to be of limited relevance in a scenario 
involving the unauthorised use of celebrity likenesses in videogames; however, it has to be 
noted that Arnold J did not expressly confine his remarks to post-sale confusion relating to 
that specific type of harm.52 There is once again precedent, should the courts choose to apply 
it, for the recognition of post-sale confusion in the context of trade mark infringement. This is 
not a possibility that can be dismiVVHG OLJKWO\ JLYHQ WKH FRXUWV¶ FXUUHQW H[SDQVLRQDU\
approach in this field of law.  
In order to make out a successful claim of trade mark infringement, the owner of the 
trade mark will also have to show that the videogame developer, in recreating that 
indLYLGXDO¶V OLNHQHVV KDV µXVHG¶ D VLJQ WKDW LV DW OHDVW VLPLODU WR WKH UHJLVWHUHG PDUN ,Q D
number of jurisdictions, infringement will occur only where a defendant has used the 
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RIIHQGLQJVLJQµDVDWUDGHPDUN¶± that is to say, where the sign has been used as a badge of 
origin.53 Other types of uses, such as descriptive or decorative uses, will not give rise to 
LQIULQJHPHQW,QWKHVHMXULVGLFWLRQVWKHUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWWKHVLJQPXVWKDYHEHHQµXVHGDVD
WUDGHPDUN¶KDVVRPHWLPHVEHHQWUHDWHGDVEHLQJFRQFHSWXDOO\VHSDUDWHIURPWKH question of 
whether consumers are likely to be confused by that particular use.54 Were this the legal 
position in the UK, the videogame developer might be able to argue, for instance, that the 
UHFUHDWLRQRIDQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V OLNHQHVV LQDYLGHRJDPHVKRXOGQRt, in itself, be regarded as a 
XVHIDOOLQJZLWKLQWKHFDWHJRU\RIµXVHDVDWUDGHPDUN¶DQ\PRUHWKDQDQRYHOLVW¶VGHVFULSWLRQ
RID OLWHUDU\FKDUDFWHUDVµZHDULQJ1LNHWUDLQHUVDQGFDUU\LQJD&RFD-&RODERWWOH¶VKRXOGEH
regarded as using NIKE and COCA-COLA as trade marks.55  
The CJEU has, however, articulated a differently-worded test of what constitutes a 
potentially infringing use of a sign. In Arsenal, it held that trade mark infringement occurs in 
FDVHVZKHUHµDWKLUGSDUW\¶VXVHRIWKHVLJQDIIHFWVRU is liable to affect the functions of the 
trade mark, in particular its essential function of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of 
JRRGV¶56 While there was some initial uncertainty as to the extent to which this formulation 
GLIIHUHG IURP WKDW RI µXVH DV D WUDGH PDUN¶57 the CJEU has, in its subsequent case law, 
LGHQWLILHGDUDQJHRIWUDGHPDUNIXQFWLRQVRWKHUWKDQWKHµRULJLQIXQFWLRQ¶H[SUHVVO\UHIHUUHG
to in Arsenal. 58  7KHVH LQFOXGH WKH µTXDOLW\ IXQFWLRQ¶ WKH µDGYHUWLVLQJ IXQFWLRQ¶ WKH
µLQYHVWPHQW IXQFWLRQ¶ DQG WKH µFRPPXQLFDWLRQ IXQFWLRQ¶ 8QGHU WKH &-(8¶V FDVH ODZ
therefore, the range of potentially infringing uses is indisputably widHUWKDQWKDWRIµXVHDVD
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WUDGH PDUN¶ 7KLV LQ WXUQ VLJQLILFDQWO\ LQFUHDVHV WKH OLNHOLKRRG WKDW WKH UHFUHDWLRQ RI D
FHOHEULW\¶VOLNHQHVVLQDYLGHRJDPHZLOOEHKHOGWRFRQVWLWXWHDQLQIULQJLQJXVH  
In Arsenal, the CJEU took a very broad view of what would amount to a use of a sign 
capable of affecting the origin function of the registered mark. In particular, it held that 
5HHG¶V XVH RI WKH $56(1$/ PDUN GLG MHRSDUGL]H WKH PDUN¶V HVVHQWLDO IXQFWLRQ RI
guaranteeing the origin of the goods, as consumers coming across the goods after the point of 
sale would perceive the sign as denoting Arsenal Football Club as the source of the goods. In 
its subsequent jurisprudence, the CJEU has increasingly linked the concept of damage to the 
origin function of the registered mark with the likelihood of confusion among consumers: in 
its case law on keyword advertising, for instance, the CJEU has consistently held that the 
PDUN¶V RULJLQ IXQFWLRQ LV DIIHFWHG ZKHUH WKH DGYHUWLVHPHQW GRHV QRW HQDEOH FRQVXPHUV RU
enables WKHPRQO\ZLWKGLIILFXOW\µWo ascertain whether the goods or services referred to by 
the ad originate from the proprietor of the trade mark or an undertaking economically 
connected to it or, on the contrary, originate from a third party¶59 In light of this, it is entirely 
SRVVLEOH WR PDNH RXW D FDVH WKDW WKH UHFUHDWLRQ RI FHOHEULW\¶V OLNHQHVV LQ WKH IRUP RI D
videogame character is a use that is capable of jeopardizing the origin function of the 
registered mark, in circumstances where there is a real possibility of the consumer perceiving 
that character as an indication that the videogame has been licensed or endorsed by the 
celebrity in question, for the reasons that have already been discussed in relation to the 
misrepresentation element of passing off. The possibility that this perception may arise only 
after the point of sale ± such as ZKHUH WKH FHOHEULW\¶V OLNHQHVV LV QRW IHDWXUHG RQ WKH
promotional materials for the videogame ± would not affect the overall assessment, given the 
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&-(8¶V UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH HIIHFWV RI SRVW-sale confusion on the origin function of the 
registered mark in Arsenal.  
,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHRULJLQIXQFWLRQWKHUHFUHDWLRQRIDFHOHEULW\¶VOLNHQHVVLQWKHIRUPRI
a videogame character also has the potential to affect the advertising, investment, and 
communication functions of the registered mark ± although, as the CJEU has yet to give a 
precise definition to each of these functions, it is difficult to state with any certainty the 
extent to which this will be the case. In relation to the advertising function, the CJEU has 
suggested that this will be affected where the unauthorised use µDdversely affects the 
proprietor's use of its mark as a factor in sales promotion or as an instrument of commercial 
VWUDWHJ\¶ 60  In DataCard, Arnold J described the advertising function of a mark as the 
IXQFWLRQRIµFRQYH\LQJDSDUWLFXODUimage to the average consumer of the goods or services in 
TXHVWLRQ¶61 ,WPLJKWEHDUJXHGWKHQWKDWWKHXQDXWKRULVHGUHFUHDWLRQRIDFHOHEULW\¶VOLkeness 
in a videogame could potentially jeopardize the advertising function of the mark, as the 
FHOHEULW\¶VORVVRIFRQWURORYHUWKHFRQWH[WLQZKLFKLWLVXVHGFRXOGOHDGWRDGLPLQXWLRQLQ its 
effectiveness as a tool for commercial strategy and promotion. The same might also be said in 
relation to the investment function, which, as the CJEU has explained, is adversely affected 
ZKHUHWKHXQDXWKRULVHGXVHµsubstantially interferes with the proprietor's use of its trade mark 
to acquire or preserve a reputation capable of attracting consumers and retaining their 
loyalty¶62 While the CJEU has yet to elaborate on the nature of the communication function, 
Advocate-General Mengozzi has linked this function with WKH UROH RI WKH WUDGH PDUN DV µa 
vehicle for providing consumers with various kinds of information on the goods identified by 
them¶ including promotional messages aimed at cultivating a particular image of the 
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product.63 This would appear to raise concerns similar to those arising in relation to the 
advertising and investment functions. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
While WKH XQDXWKRULVHG UHFUHDWLRQ RI D FHOHEULW\¶V OLNHQHVV LQ WKH IRUP RI D YLGHRJDPH
character is unlikely to give rise to any claims of infringement under copyright law, the 
position may well be very different in relation to the law of passing off and the law of trade 
mark. While such a scenario might appear far removed from the paradigmatic case of passing 
off or trade mark infringement, over the last few decades, the ambit of each of these 
intellectual property regimes has expanded to the point where its applicability to activities 
such as this can no longer be dismissed out of hand. For some, these developments might 
well be a positive indication of the malleability of intellectual property law and its ability to 
keep pace with contemporary commercial reality. Through these developments, however, the 
law has now come closer than ever to the effective recognition of a well-NQRZQSHUVRQDOLW\¶V
exclusive right to their own image, even though the courts have consistently asserted the non-
existence of such a right under the law of the UK. The seemingly self-contained issue of the 
recreation of celebrity likenesses in videogames thus highlights the expansion that has taken 
place within these two intellectual property regimes over a relatively short period. If the law 
is to continue on its present trajectory, therefore, there needs to be more awareness of its 
likely destination, as well as a greater willingness to interrogate the implications of these 
developments, both positive and negative.  
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